Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games I by Scalas, Enrico et al.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
60
82
15
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
2 A
ug
 20
06
EPJ manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Statistical equilibrium in simple exchange games I
Methods of solution and application to the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) game
Enrico Scalas1, Ubaldo Garibaldi2, and Stefania Donadio3
1 Department of Advanced Sciences and Technology, Laboratory on Complex Systems, East Piedmont University, Via Bellini
25 g, 15100 Alessandria, Italy
2 IMEM-CNR, Physics Department, Genoa University, via Dodecaneso 33, 16146, Genoa, Italy
3 INFN, Physics Department, Genoa University, via Dodecaneso 33, 16146, Genoa, Italy
Received: date / Revised version: date
Abstract. Simple stochastic exchange games are based on random allocation of finite resources. These
games are Markov chains that can be studied either analytically or by Monte Carlo simulations. In partic-
ular, the equilibrium distribution can be derived either by direct diagonalization of the transition matrix,
or using the detailed balance equation, or by Monte Carlo estimates. In this paper, these methods are
introduced and applied to the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) game. The exact analysis shows that
the statistical-mechanical analogies used in the previous literature have to be revised.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management – 02.50.Cw Prob-
ability theory
1 Introduction
Agent-based models used for simulating the allocation of
finite resources in economics include g agents that can
interact. These interactions can be direct and can include
both two-body and many-body terms, but they can also be
indirect, through some coupling and feedback mechanism
with an external field.
Each agent i is characterized by a certain quantity ni,
which represents either size, or wealth or another relevant
quantity. The interactions determine a variation of ni as
a function of time. In the models, the evolution of the
system can be described both in continuous time and in
discrete time. In this framework, it is worth mentioning
the so-called Interacting Particle Systems paradigm that
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includes, as special cases, percolation, the Ising model, the
voter model, and the contact model [1].
In general, these models are Markov chains or conti-
nuous-time Markov processes. Therefore, there is a full
set of mathematical tools to analyze them and compute
the equilibrium distribution. In this paper, however, the
focus is on conservative models, where the total number
of agents, g, and the total size or wealth, n =
∑g
i=1 ni,
are conserved by the dynamics.
John Angle has introduced the so-called One Parame-
ter Inequality Process (OPIP) that can be defined as fol-
lows. Let us suppose that there are g players in a room,
each of them with an initial amount of money, ni(0) =
n/g. Two individuals are randomly selected to play against
each other. They flip a coin and the winner gets a fixed
fraction, ω, of the loser’s money. Then the game is iter-
ated. If j and k are the selected players at step t, their
amount of money at step t+ 1 is given by:
nj(t+ 1) = nj(t) + ωd(t+ 1)nk(t)− ω(1− d(t+ 1))nj(t),
and
nk(t+ 1) = nk(t)− ωd(t+ 1)nk(t) + ω(1− d(t+ 1))nj(t),
where d(t) is a Bernoullian random variable assuming the
value 1 with probability 1/2 or the value 0 with probability
1/2. Angle has studied the equilibrium distribution for the
OPIP by means of Monte Carlo simulations and analytical
approximations [2,3,4].
The Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) model de-
scribed in [5,6] and rediscovered in [7] is very similar to
the OPIP, but there is an important difference. After the
coin toss, the winner receives a fixed amount of money, d.
Indebtedness is impossible: Players reaching ni = 0 can-
not lose money any more. If they are selected to play and
they lose, they stay with no money, if they win, they get
the fixed amount of money from the loser. On the con-
trary, in the OPIP, very poor agents always lose only a
fraction of their money, and they never reach the situa-
tion ni = 0. In the OPIP, the variables ni are intrinsically
continuous, whereas in the BDY model they can be con-
sidered discrete.
To summarize, the BDY game can be described as
follows. Let us consider a system of g > 1 individuals
(agents) who share n coins, n ≥ g. At each discrete time
step two agents are chosen, and they toss a coin. At the
end of the bet, the winner has one more coin and the loser
has one coin less (d = 1 is assumed, without loss of gener-
ality). Agents’ choice is random (i.e. each distinct couple
has the same probability to be extracted) and each bet is
fair. If the loser has no coins, then the move is forbidden
and a new couple of players is extracted. An equivalent
formulation of the game, avoiding forbidden moves, is the
following. An agent is chosen randomly among all those
having at least one coin, and this agent is declared to be
the loser; the winner is chosen randomly among all agents.
This paper will be devoted to an analysis of the BDY
game. In section II, the basic random variables for the
description of the game will be introduced. Section III
will be devoted to the methods of solution and it is the
core section of this paper. Finally, in section IV a critical
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discussion of the results will be presented. The reader will
find further mathematical details in an appendix.
2 Random Variables
In the BDY game, as well as in similar exchange games,
one has to allocate n coins among g agents. In the follow-
ing, a random variable will be denoted by a capital letter:
A, whereas a will refer to a specific value or realization.
The most complete description of the game states is
in terms of coin configurations: X = (X1, . . . , Xn). Each
random variable Xi is associated to the ith−coin, and its
range is the set of agents; for instance, X7 = 3 denotes
that the 7th−coin belongs to the 3rd−agent. The total
number of configurations for n coins distributed among g
agents is gn. This can be called the coin description.
The second (and most important in the present case)
description is in terms of coin occupation numbers, Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yg), where the random variable Yj denotes the
number of coins (the wealth) of the jth−agent. If the set
of configurations,X, is known, then Yj |X = # {Xi : Xi =
j, i = 1, ..., n}, that is the value of Yj conditioned on X is
the number, nj , of all Xi equal to j. Then, one can de-
fine Y = n := (n1, . . . , ng) as the set of occupation num-
bers; they satisfy the constraint
∑g
1 ni = n. This can be
called the agent description. It tells us the number of coins
(wealth) of each agent. The total number of distinct agent
descriptions for g agents sharing n coins is
(
n+ g − 1
n
)
.
The less complete description is in terms of coin oc-
cupancy numbers or partitions: Z = (Z0 . . . Zn), where
Zh|Y = #{nj = h, j = 1, ..., g}, that is the number
(not the names or labels) of agents with h coins. This
is the frequency distribution of agents, commonly referred
to as wealth distribution; it is an event, not to be confused
with a probability distribution. The constraints for Z are
∑n
0 zi = g,
∑n
0 izi = n. For the BDY game, the number
of agents without money, z0, is very important. Its com-
plement is k = g − z0, the number of agents with at least
one coin.
3 Methods of solution
3.1 An irreducible Markov chain
The dynamic mechanism of the BDY game is the hop-
ping of a coin from one agent (the loser) to another (the
winner). The natural description is in terms of agents,
Y = (n1, . . . , ng). Let us suppose that at given time, t, the
agents are described by the state Y(t) = (n1, . . . , ng) :=
n. At the next step, the possible values of Y(t + 1) are:
Y(t + 1) = (n1, .., ni − 1, ..., nj + 1, .., ng) := n
j
i , corre-
sponding to the a loss of the ith− agent and a win of the
jth− one. The transition probability between these states
is:
P (nji |n) =
1− δni,0
g − z0(n)
1− δi,j
g − 1
(1)
where the first term, (1−δni,0)/(g−z0(n)) = (1−δni,0)/k(n),
describes the random choice of the loser among the agents
with at least one coin (ni > 0), and the second term,
(1 − δi,j)/(g − 1), is the probability that the jth− agent
is the winner. As also an agent with zero coins can be
a winner, there are no absorbing states. Note that in eq.
(1) the assumption is made that coins necessarily change
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agent; if one admits that coins can come back to the
loser, the second term simplifies to 1/g, the dynamics
slightly changes, but the equilibrium distribution is not af-
fected. Considering both the intuitive meaning of the game
and the formal transition probability (1), the sequence
Y(0),Y(1), ...,Y(t) is a discrete-space and discrete-time
Markov process, i.e. a finite Markov chain; every state can
be reached from any other state, the set of states is irre-
ducible, and no periodicity is present. Hence, there exists
an invariant probability distribution, and this distribu-
tion coincides with the equilibrium one. This means that
limt−>∞ P (Y(t) = n|Y(0) = n
′) = pi(n), independently
from the initial state Y(0) = n′. Moreover, pi(n) >0 holds
for all the
(
n+ g − 1
n
)
possible occupation numbers.
3.2 Direct enumeration and Monte Carlo sampling
The direct enumeration method can be used to study the
game when g and n are not too large. To illustrate the
method, let us consider the case g = n = 3. The total num-
ber of agent descriptions is 10: (0, 0, 3); (0, 3, 0); (3, 0, 0);
(0, 1, 2); (1, 0, 2); (1, 2, 0); (0, 2, 1); (2, 0, 1); (2, 1, 0); (1, 1, 1).
The transition matrix between these states can be directly
computed by using the rules of the game. For instance,
the state (0, 0, 3) can only go into the two states (0, 1, 2)
and (1, 0, 2) with equal probability 1/2. The state (0, 1, 2)
can go into the four states (1, 0, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 1, 1), and
(0, 0, 3) and each final state can be reached with probabil-
ity 1/4. These considerations lead to the definition of the
following 10× 10 transition matrix:
P =


0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/4 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4 0 0
1/4 0 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 0
0 1/4 0 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 0 1/4
0 1/4 0 1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0 0 0
0 0 1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0 0 0 1/4
0 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0


.
The vector, pi, giving the equilibrium probability distribu-
tion can be computed diagonalizing P, as its transpose,
pit , satisfies: pitP = pit. In particular, in this case, one
gets: pi(0, 0, 3) = pi(0, 3, 0) = pi(3, 0, 0) = 1/18, pi(1, 1, 1) =
1/6, and pi(0, 1, 2) = pi(1, 0, 2) = pi(1, 2, 0) = pi(0, 2, 1) =
pi(2, 0, 1) = pi(2, 1, 0) = 1/9. A Monte Carlo simulation
of the game can help in the case of larger systems. The
simulation can sample both the transition matrix and the
equilibrium distribution. Both methods, direct enumera-
tion and Monte Carlo sampling, are limited by the size
of the state space. However, for the BDY game a general
exact solution can be derived.
3.3 Exact solution
As the size of the state space is a rapidly growing function
of n and g, the invariant distribution can be investigated
via the detailed balance equation [8].
Let us consider two consecutive states: (n1, .., ni, ...,
nj, .., ng) and (n1, .., ni− 1, ..., nj+1, .., ng), with the con-
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ditions ni > 0 and i 6= j . The direct flux is given by
pi(n)P (nji |n) = pi(n)
1
g − z0(n)
1
g − 1
;
the inverse flux is
pi(nji )P (n|n
j
i ) =pi(n
j
i )
1
g − z0(n
j
i )
1
g − 1
.
The two fluxes are equal if
pi(n)
1
g − z0(n)
1
g − 1
= pi(nji )
1
g − z0(n
j
i )
1
g − 1
,
that is if pi(n) 1g−z0(n) = C, where C is a constant.
Hence the probability function:
P (Y = n) =pi(n) =Ck(n) = C(g − z0(n)) (2)
is invariant, and it coincides with the equilibrium one.
Two remarks are useful. First of all, in eq. (2) pi(n)
does not depend on the agent labels but is a function of the
partition Z(n) to which the description Y = n belongs.
This implies that all the sequences Y = n′ and Y = n are
equiprobable, if n′ and n belong to the same Z, that is if
n′ is any permutation of n. Therefore, the random vari-
ables (Y1, . . . , Yg) are exchangeable [8], and they are also
equidistributed, once equilibrium has been reached and eq.
(2) holds. All n belonging to the same Z being equiprob-
able, one gets for the partition probability distribution:
Π(z) =
g!∏n
0 zi!
pi(n) = C
g!∏n
0 zi!
(g − z0(n)) (3)
Secondly, only those agent descriptions sharing the
same number of agents without coins have the same prob-
ability. Indeed, the probability of a given occupation vec-
tor n depends on z0(n), and, thus, it is not uniform. The
reader is invited to verify this property in the particular
case g = n = 3 described in the previous subsection.
The hypothesis of equal a priori probabilities for all
the agent descriptions seems at the basis of Bennati’s and
Dragulescu and Yakovenko’s analysis of the game, whose
conclusions are not fully correct if one considers eq. (2).
This hypothesis on occupation numbers can already be
found in a paper by Boltzmann published in 1868 and
leading to the so-called Bose-Einstein statistics [9,10,11].
Indeed, if pi(n) were uniform in eq. (3), one would get the
most probable value of zi by maximizing the multinomial
prefactor subject to the constraints for Z. In the limit of
large systems, the result is z∗i =
1
a
e−
i
a . At the end of
the next subsection, the limit n >> g >> 1 will be con-
sidered for the BDY game, where the exponential wealth
distribution is recovered as an approximation to the exact
solution.
The normalization constant C is computed in the Ap-
pendix, based on the method described in a paper by Hill
[12]. It turns out that:
C =
1
∑g
k=1 k
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
k − 1
) (4)
Eqs. (2), (3), together with the normalization (4), give
the equilibrium distributions for the BDY game.
3.4 The average wealth distribution
The number of the agent descriptions, n, and of the par-
titions, Z, is very large for g and n large. Moreover, both
pi(n) and Π(z) are multidimensional distributions. In or-
der to search for a quantity that can compared with ex-
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perimental observations, one can notice that agents are
exchangeable and any probability distribution is symmet-
ric with respect to the exchange of their labels. Empirical
data are given in terms of the actual wealth distribution
z. At any step, Z(t) = z(t) is just the actual wealth dis-
tribution. If equilibrium is reached, Π(z) represents the
multivariate sampling distribution, and the vector E(z)
denotes the set of first moments of Π(z). It is useful to
define the marginal average
E(zi) =
∑
z
ziΠ(z). (5)
Z continuously fluctuates around E(z). As a conse-
quence of the ergodic thorem for Markov chains, one has
that limt→∞
∑ t
s=1
zi(s)
t = E(zi), and this convergence is in
probability. Hence, if the empirical or simulated sequence,
z(0), z(1), ..., z(t), is available, the comparison is possi-
ble between the time average
∑
t
s=1
zi(s)
t and the ensem-
ble average E(zi) predicted from the knowledge of Π(z).
E(zi), the average wealth distribution, will coincide with
the most probable value of Z (say z∗) for large systems.
As already noticed, if pi(n) were uniform, then one could
find the most probable value of Z, z∗, by using Lagrange
multipliers, and the functional form of z∗ would be expo-
nential in the Stirling approximation.
In the BDY game, this is not the case. However, as
a consequence of eq. (2), pi(n) is uniform for all vectors
with the same k = g−z0. The exact value of E(zi) can be
derived analyzing all the agent descriptions with the same
k. Conditioned on k, one gets:


E(z0|k) = g − k

E(zi|k > 1) = k
(
n− i− 1
k − 2
)
(
n− 1
k − 1
) , i = 1, ..., n
E(zi|k = 1) = δi,n, i = 1, ..., n
(6)
and the equilibrium probability of k is
P (k) = Ck
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
k − 1
)
(7)
Finally, using eqs. (4), (6) and (7), one gets
E(zi) =
g∑
k=1
E(zi|k)P (k), i = 0, 1, ..., n (8)
The proof of the above results can be found in the Ap-
pendix. Notice that the thermodynamic limit (n, g, k >>
1) of eq. (6) is
E(zi+1|k)
k
≃
k
n
(
1−
k
n
)i
. Then, the av-
erage fraction of agents with at least one coin follows a
geometric distribution that becomes exponential in the
continuous limit. In this limit, the average wealth distri-
bution, E(zi), (or the most probable wealth distribution
z∗i ) is a mixture of exponential distributions with mixing
measure given by eq. (7).
Considering eq. (7), one observes that
P (k + 1)
P (k)
=
(g − k)(n− k)
k2
with P (k+1)P (k) > 1 for k < k
∗ = ngn+g , and
P (k+1)
P (k) < 1
for k > k∗. Therefore, in the case of minimum density,
n = g, one has that P (k) is bell-shaped with flat maximum
at k∗ = ngn+g and k
∗ + 1, as P (k+1)P (k) = 1, k
∗ = g2 . In
the large density limit n >> g, the curve is left-skewed,
the maximum is very close to g, as k∗ = g1+g/n ≃ g(1 −
g/n). Furthermore, if g(1− g/n) > g − 1, i.e. g2 < n, the
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maximum value is just k∗ = g. In the case of large density,
the mixing probability distribution is concentrated on a
small number of values of k, and, thus, if g >> 1 the
behaviour is not very different from the single geometric
distribution
E(zi+1|g)
g
≃
g
n
(
1−
g
n
)i
, that becomes the
exponential
1
χ
e−
i
χ , χ = ng . This remark explains why large
scale simulations of the BDY game with n >> g appear
compatible with an exponential wealth distribution.
3.5 Comparison with Monte Carlo simulations
In this section, the results of Monte Carlo simulations are
compared with the exact equilibrium wealth distribution.
The simulations have been performed on a standard desk-
top computer equipped with a 1GHz processor. In the
initial state all the agents are given the same amount of
coins. After an equilibration run of 1000 MC steps, the
values of zi have been sampled and averaged over 10
5 MC
steps. In the cases reported in Figs. 1-3, the execution time
is a few seconds.
It is interesting to remark that for small values of g
the distribution is strongly dependent on g: it is uniform
for g = 2, linear for g = 3, parabolic for for g = 4,. . ..
Except for the very peculiar case g = 2, the distribution
is decreasing for i > 1, but in some cases E(z0) < E(z1).
The latter feature deserves further investigations. Fig.1
shows the case g = 3 and n = 3, whereas Fig.2 has again 3
agents, but 30 coins. Fig.3 is the logarithmic graph for g =
30 and n = 30 to illustrate the approach to an exponential-
type distribution for large values of the number of agents,
g.
0 1 2 3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
i
E(
z i)
Fig. 1. Theoretical (cross) and simulated (circle) points for
g = 3, n = 3, after 105 simulation steps.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
i
E(
z i)
Fig. 2. Theoretical (cross) and simulated (circle) points for
g = 3, n = 30, after 105 simulation steps.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
105
i
E(
z i)
Fig. 3. Theoretical (cross) and simulated (circle) points for
g = 30, n = 30, after 105 simulation steps. The simulation is
too short to reproduce the smaller values of E(zi) for i ≥ 15.
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4 Discussion and conclusions
Recently, parsimonious exchange games like the one stud-
ied in this paper have been challenged by a group of lead-
ing non-orthodox economists [13,14]. These games have
been introduced in order to explain the allocation of wealth
in the presence of finite resources. In [13,14], they are
considered unrealistic because they do not take into ac-
count the free will of agents to participate in an exchange,
and they include only strictly conserved resources, with-
out production. Incidentally, in games such as the OPIP or
the BDY models, inequality is obtained by pure chance.
Rich agents have no specific individual merit. Based on
their beliefs, some scholars could also dislike this feature.
Replies to the objections in [13,14] have already ap-
peared in two papers by Angle [15] and by McCauley [16].
In particular, Angle presents various arguments in favour
of parsimonious exchange games, including their ability to
reproduce empirical facts [17].
The present authors would also like to stress that, also
thanks to simple exchange models, a new concept of equi-
librium could find its way into Economics: namely Sta-
tistical equilibrium. Many stochastic models in Economics
are Markov chains or Markov processes (see refs. [18,19,
20] for recent examples) and the concepts developed in
this paper apply to those cases. These ideas will be the
subject of future papers on the role of statistical equilib-
rium in Economics. The reader can consult ref. [21] for
an early discussion and refs. [16,22] for a criticism on the
relevance of thermodynamic equilibrium in Economics.
One of the main results of this paper is eq. (8), giving
the so-called wealth distribution. As the agent descriptions
are not equiprobable, previous statistical mechanical ar-
guments have to be revised. In general, the wealth distri-
bution is not exponential and it becomes exponential only
in the appropriate limit of large density and large number
of agents. It is interesting to study the rate of approach
to equilibrium in the BDY model, but this will the sub-
ject of a future paper of this series. The next paper of the
series, will be devoted to a set of simple exchange models
for the redistribution of wealth that can be regarded as
toy taxation mechanisms.
APPENDIX
The normalization constant
The total number of possible agent descriptions, n, is
W (g, n) =
(
n+ g − 1
n
)
,
and they can be classified in terms of the number of agents
with at least one coin: k = g − z0, k = 1, ..., g. Therefore,
the number of agent descriptions with k fixed agents with
at least one coin is given by all occupation numbers which
allocate n− k coins to k agents, that is
(
n− k + k − 1
n− k
)
=
(
n− 1
n− k
)
=
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
,
while
(
g
k
)
are the different ways to choose the k agents
among the g available. Then
W (k, g, n) =
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
n− k
)
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is the number of agent descriptions with k agents with at
least one coin. Indeed, one has:
(
n+ g − 1
n
)
=
g∑
k=1
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
n− k
)
,
and this formula expresses the decomposition of all possi-
ble states in terms of their “support” k. The decomposi-
tion can be re-written as:
W (g, n) =
g∑
k=1
W (k, g, n).
Turning to eq.(2), the sum on all states can be divided
into a sum over k and a sum over n|k, that is:
1 =
∑
n
pi(n) = C
∑
n
k(n) = C
g∑
k=1
kW (k, g, n) =
C
g∑
k=1
k
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
n− k
)
,
which gives the desired normalization constant.
Derivation of equation (6)
The average number of agents whose occupation num-
ber is equal to i is
E(zi) =
g∑
j=1
P (Yj = i) = gP (Yj = i),
the last equality holding as the Y ′s are equidistributed.
P (Yj = i), i = 0, 1, ..., n is the marginal equilibrium prob-
ability of the wealth of the jth−agent, and it is the same
for all j’s. It is necessary to study the marginal distribu-
tion of an agent associated to the agent description proba-
bility (2) and to the partition probability (3), both holding
at equilibrium. In order to derive formula (6), one needs
E(zi|k) = gP (Yj = i|k) :
the marginal wealth distribution of an agent conditioned
to k = g − z0. One knows from (2) that all agent descrip-
tions Y = n := (Y1 = n1, ..., Yg = ng) with the same k are
equiprobable, and their number is
W (k, g, n) =
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
n− k
)
=
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
k − 1
)
.
Then P (Y1 = n1|k) := P (Y = i|k) is equal to the number
of Y′s such that g − 1 agents share n − i coins divided
by W (k, g, n). The calculation can be divided into three
parts. First, let us consider P (Y = 0|k); one has:
P (Y = 0|k) =
W (k, g − 1, n)
W (k, g, n)
=
(
g − 1
k
)(
n− 1
k − 1
)
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
k − 1
) =
(
g − 1
k
)
(
g
k
) = (g − 1)!
(g − 1− k)!
(g − k)!
g!
=
g − k
g
,
then, let us consider P (Y = i|k) with k ≥ 2, and i > 0; as
there are k− 1 agents left with at least one coin, one has:
P (Y = i|k) =
W (k − 1, g − 1, n− i)
W (k, g, n)
=
(
g − 1
k − 1
)(
n− i− 1
k − 2
)
(
g
k
)(
n− 1
n− k
) = k
g
(
n− i− 1
k − 2
)
(
n− 1
k − 1
) , (9)
finally, for k = 1, one gets: P (Y = i|k = 1) =
δi,n
g , for
i > 0, as in this case all coins are concentrated on a single
agent. Eventually, by determining E(zi|k), one obtains eq.
(6) as required.
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